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A COMPARISON OF THE ROLES OF AMERICAN AND CIVIL LAW JUDGES
IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW*

The traditional distinction between a judge in the Civil Law
System and his counterpart in the United States is that the former
only applies codified law, while the latter not only applies but
also "makes" law through judicial decision.

The theory underlying

the Civil Law System holds that development of the law is the
exclusive province of the legislature and that judges are not to
engage in such activity unless the legislature-permits it. In
France, for example, to ensure that judges do not exceed their
authority, the Civil Code prohibits a judge, under threat of
criminal sanction, from basing a decision on precedent, so as to
prevent the development of general principles of law through
judicial decision°. A similar prohibition is found in the Austrian
General Civil Code of 1811, which expressly states that a case
decision is not a source of law and may not be relied upon as
precedent.2 It is provisions such as these which led Dean Pound
to label civil law courts "judicial slot machines."'3 The most
pronounced differences between the two legal systems is theoretical,
since the theory behind the United States system openly acknowledges
the impossibility of separating the functions of "applying" and
"making" the law, and maintains that the two functions are not only
complimentary but also interrelated and interacting. 4 American
legal theory even maintains that judges may nullify law created by
legislatures if that law is found to be "unconstitutional." Thus,
by contrasting the theories behind the two systems the civil law
judiciary is depicted as being passive while the American judiciary
is depicted as being active.
The respective roles of the judges of the two systems as
developers of the law have their foundations in the historical
development of the systems and the countries in which they are
found. The source of the American legal system is the Common Law
of England, a body of principles and rules derived from AngloSaxon customs which were recognized, affirmed and enforced by the
courts in the early history of England, before the advent of
statutory law. It was the early common law judge who recognized
and enforced these customs, thereby creating rules of law which,
through development of and adherence to the doctrine of stare decisis,
prevented judicial arbitrariness, gave continuity to the law, and
made possible a legal system based upon uncodified, judge-made law.
*The following note was submitted as part of the final examination
in the1 course on comparative law taught by Professor Harold G. Maier.
H. Cachard, The French Civil Code art. 5 (1895); G. Mueller,
The French Penal Code art. 127 (1960).
2 Sections 7 and 12.
See R. Schlesinger, Cases and Materials in
Comparative Law 317 (1959); Lenhoff, On Interpretative Theories: A
Comparative Study in Legislation, 27 Tex. L. Rev. 312, 321 (1949).
3 R. Pound, The Spirit
of the Common Law 170 (1921).
4 R. Schlesinger, supra
note 2, at 311 n. 1; Lipstein, The Doctrine
of Precedent in Continental Law with Special Reference to French and
German Law, 28 Jo Comp. Leg. & Int. L. (2d Ser.) 34 (1946).

Because the common law courts played a leading role in the
unification of law in England, and were successful in resisting
interferences by Stuart kings, they also became identified with
the forces of liberty, which won them the support and respect of
Thus,
the people and enabled them to endure to the present day.
while most of the law in the United States today is in the form
of statutes, the traditional role of the judge as a highly
respected law-maker remains. The continuance of this role is
assured through statutory enactments preserving the general jurisdiction in law and equity which the courts had in England and in
the United States before 1789.6 It is this traditional role which
today gives judges in the United States a very high social and
professional status.
The Civil Law System was developed in Europe in the late
Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries when revolutionary breaks with
the past in various countries produced forces for unification.
During this period the failure of the continental courts to lead
in the development and national unification of law, their canonistic
inquisitorial procedure, and their failure to create remedies for
7
official oppression caused them to lose popular respect and support.
In France the courts became identified with the despised ancien
regime and were destroyed with it during the French Revolution.
(In Germany the repudiation of the past was not so violent nor so
complete as in France.) Throughout Europe, during the period of
political unification, the codes became the instruments for national
unification of law. 8 Provisions in the various codes reflect each
nation's experiences. For example, France's violent repudiation of
the past is reflected in the rigid subordination of her judiciary
to the law-making authority of the legislature and in the rejection
of precedent as a source of law. 9 The subordination of the judiciary
and the rejection of precedent rendered unnecessary the doctrine of
stare decisis in civil law. The subordination of judges also
resulted in their being mere civil servants, a status far below
that of American judges.
While the codes theoretically embody "all the law there is,"
the application of code provisions necessitates interpretation of
their meaning, giving civilian judges a practical law-making power,
5 R.

Schlesinger, note 2 supra at 179.
6§11 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat, 78, 28 U.S.C. § 41(1).
See "Cases at Law or in Equity" in The Constitution of the United
States of America 452 (1938).
7 R. Schlesinger,
note 2 supra, at 180.
8 Id.,
at 181.
9 While the strictness of adherence to the theory underlying
the Civil Law System varies among the nations in which it is found,
the French Codes express the general idea common to all of a
rejection of precedent as a major source of law and the subordination
of the judiciary to the legislature.

even though such power is indirect. Early codifications - eoo,
the Prussian Code of 1794 - attempted to provide rules covering
all legal problems that might conceivably arise, but by the
beginning of the Nineteenth Century it had become clear that this
was impossible. Codifiers therefore provided a number of broad,
general provisions to assure the flexibility of the law and its
adaptability to unanticipated situationso 1 0 The basic concept
underlying codification, however, was that rational men could
fashion a written system of law to solve all legal problems. The
codes are meant to be essentially an all-inclusive statement of
the law though malleable and subject to change by the legislature
as the need arises, Thus, while code provisions, especially the
broad, general provisions, require judicial interpretation, the
judge looks to the codes as the repository of all judicial powers,
remedies, and procedural devices, 1 1 The codes also contain guides
for judges' use in their interpretation and application. For
example, consider Section 138 of the German Civil Code:
(1) A jural act which is contra bonos mores is void ..
(2) In particular a jural act is void whereby a person exploiting the difficulties, indiscretion, or inexperience of
another, causes to be promised or granted to himself or to
a third party for a consideration, pecuniary advantages
which exceed the value of the consideration to such an extent that, having regard to the circumstances, the dispro12
portion is obvious.
This section states a general principle followed by a more specific
detailing of acts which are pr6hibited by the general principle.
The inclusion of the specific acts do not rule out application of
the general principle to other situations a judge is free to
apply the principle to unspecified circumstances. The specific
examples serve only as guides in the interpretation and application of the general principle. This method may be compared to
the ejusdem generis rule of statutory construction used by American
judges, which requires that general words in a statute be construed
to apply only to the kind or class of persons or things specifically
mentioned in the statute. Nonetheless, American courts may reach
virtually any construction of a statute by using any one of many
rules of construction such as the "rational interpretation,"
"plain meaning" or "equitable construction" rules - which are
available, Certainly civilian judges are not as free as American'
judges in the interpretation of code provisions. But the fact that
code reform has been brought about by the interpretation and
supersession of outmoded code provisions through decisional law
indicates that civilian judges have more freedom of interpretation
than civilian theory would indicate. 1 3 A civilian judge, just as
I0 R. Schlesinger, note 2 supra, at 182 n. 14.
111d. at 176.
12_o at 268, 301-02.
1 3 Id

at 265.

his American counterpart, has to choose between conflicting policies
underlying the law. In resolving the conflict, and in any interpretation, the civilian judge will seek to give effect to the
legislative intent behind the code provisions. He may have to make
a value judgment concerning which policy is to be given the greatest
weight, but his judgment will be guided by what he thinks the
legislature intended. This is no different from the interpretive
process used by American judges. The judges of both systems
exercise judicial discretion, The difference lies in the source
of that discretion. The civilian judge has judicial discretion
by virtue of legislative grace; but the American judge has discretion by virtue of his position as a member of a branch of
government co-equal with the legislature and by reason of his
historic law-making role. Discretion is inherent in his office
and is independent of any written law.
The principal judicial method used by civilian judges--the
process of analogy--is the method through which most judicial
civil law development is brought about. Civilian judges commonly
use the process of analogy to derive legal principles from
existing provisions of law. In many instances, the process of
analogy requires modification of a principle so that it will more
satisfactorily resolve the controversy to which it is applied,
resulting in the development of a different principle of law.
A civilian judge will first look to a particular statute, code
section or group of sections to derive a principle with which to
resolve the controversy before him. If that does not produce a
satisfactory solution, he may then look to the broad principles
which permeate the entier code--the "spirit" of the code system. 1 4
In this process, the civilian judge assumes that all the law is
in the code, either expressly or implicitly; he merely "finds"
legal principles through analogizing from code provisions. This
method is used not only to resolve the common, every-day legal
problems, but also to fill gaps between code provisions. 1 5 The
American judge, on the other hand, in theory does not usually
find law through the process of analogy. Rather, he "makes" law
by deriving a rule for resolving the particular case before him
from general principles and rules expressed in prior cases. This
judicial method derives from the common law, which is the
foundation of American jurisprudence.
The principal civil law method is exemplified by the concept
of abuse of rights. In German law, the concept of abuse of
rights--that the use of a legal right in such a way as to intentionally harm another is contrary to good morals and "against the
law"--was developed by judges from general principles found in
the Civil Code, Specifically, it was fashioned out of:
(1) Articles
1 4 1d.

1571.

at 275-76.
at 276.

826 and 138, which seek to repress acts which are contra boni
mores;
(2) Article 226, which forbids the exercise of a right
solely for the purpose of harming another; and (3) Articles 157
and 242, which require the performance and interpretation of
contracts according to the principles of bona fides. 1 6 This
method of developing the law is alien to the common law, and
until recent times, was infrequently used by American judges.
Nonetheless, the complexities of modern society, which have
necessitated the enactment of vast amounts of statutory law to
regulate new problems, have brought about an increased use of the
process of analogy. This is exemplified by the creation of a
"federal common law', based upon existing labor statutes and
engendered by § 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947.17
Section 301 provides that suits for the enforcement of collective
bargaining agreements may be brought in federal district courts
without regard to the requirements of diversity jurisdiction. In
Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills 1 8 the United States Supreme
Court held that "the substantive law to apply in suits under
§301(a) is federal law, which the courts must fashion from the
policy of our national labor laws." This ruling will require
federal judges to develop a body of law based upon all relevant
federal labor statutes by using a civil law judicial method.
Further reference to the civil law in practice will serve to
qualify the impression produced by civilian theory that precedent
is unimportant and that civilian judges play a minor role in the
development of the law. The abuse of rights illustration, among
others, shows that civilian case law plays an important role as
persuasive authority and that civilian judges "create" law,
though less openly and frequently than American judges. A notable
exception to civilian theory is civilian administrative law--a
separate body of civil law involving controversies over the
validity and propriety of governmental action which was not
codified as was private law, but which, in general, consists of
19
statutes applied by a separate set of administrative courts.
In France administrative law is almost entirely judge-made, and
it was developed in the common law manner.
On rare occasions it has been necessary for civilian judges
to create rules of case law contrary to the express terms of
code provisions, or to previous interpretations of code provisions. In Germany the authority of judges to abrogate a provision of the written law by a rule of decisional law is openly
recognized and supported by authoritative textbooks. For example,
in one case a woman brought suit against a close corporation to
invalidate a stock subscription and against a minority shareholder
1 6 1d.

at 374-75°
172 U.S.C. § 185,
18353 U.S. 448 (1957).
1 9 R. Schlesinger, note 2 supra at 183.

to cancel a mortgage on land she had transferred to the corporation as consideration for the subscription. The basis of her
action was that she had been exploited by the shareholder-defendant,
contrary to Section 138 of the German Civil Code, supra. The court
rendered judgment for the plaintiff against the shareholderdefendant, holding that she could bring a tort action for damages
against him for his exploitation in violation of Section 138.
Nevertheless, the court, relying upon a rule of case law, refused
to cancelthe mortgage or invalidate the subscription. The court
held that Section 138 was inapplicable as against the corporate
defendant, because a statement of the corporation's capital base,
which included plaintiff's land, had been entered in the public
registry, upon which the investing public and creditors would
rely. 2 0 Thus, civilian judges may and do use judge-made rules
of law, even to override provisions of the written law which, on
their face, control the disposition of a case.
A view similar to that of German courts prevails in
Switzerland, where the Civil Code expressly states that a judge
may decide a case in accordance with prior decisions when the
Code does not furnish the solution. 2 1 The Germans, however,
distinguish between such rare instances when case law may be a
source of formally binding authority and the usual situation in
which prior decisions are persuasive, but not binding, in the
interpretation of the written law. 2 2 In France it is held that
case decisions may supplement but not abrogate a rule of written
law; but the line between supplementation and abrogation can become indistinct, and in rare instances even French courts have
changed a rule of code law through use of judge-made case law.
Nevertheless, the French maintain a theoretical distinction
between the law of the codes and rules of law which may be
created by judicial decision. While the Germans go so far as to
base decisions expressly on prior cases, the French base decisions
only on code provisions. But in practice the distinction which
the French make may be unimportant when one realizes that French
tort law is derived from case law giving concrete meaning to
broad provisions in the French Civil Code. 2 3 Thus, case law can
operate as precedent even though it is not acknowledged as such
by French jurists.
The German case involving exploitation of a minority shareholder, discussed above, provides an example of the difference
between the law-making roles of the two systems' judges in the
fashioning of legal remedies. While the broad provisions of
law, exemplified by Section 138, may be deemed the civil law
2 0 0pinion

of German Reichsgericht in the Matter of
v.K (1928), in R. Schlesinger, note 2 supra,
GM.B.H,
Neuergasthof
at 301.
2 lArticle 1, in R. Schlesinger, note 2 supra, at 318.
2 2 Id. at 306.
2_Id.

at 307-08.

counterpart of equitable principles in the common law,2 4 nowhere
in civil law is there any legal basis for the fashioning of
remedies according to the needs of the case, which American
judges may do in equity. This creative power of American judges
has been increased with the merger of law and equity and the widespread availability of equitable remedies in American law. In
the Civil Law there is no such flexibility in developing remedies;
judges must look to the codes which specify the relief to be given.
In the case discussed above, if there had been no creditors or
public reliance involved, an American judge would have invalidated
the subscription and ordered reconveyance of the plaintiff's land
to her. The civilian judge did not even inquire whether any
creditors or investors were involved; such considerations were
irrelevant. The decision and remedy would have been the same
whether actual or potential creditors were involved and whether
or not the corporation's capital would actually have been impaired. In the area of legal remedies, the civilian judge does
not seem to have even a practical, much less a theoretical, lawmaking power0
The roles of the judges in the two systems as developers of
the law differ substantially in theory, but in practice these
roles show much less divergence. In the United States judicial
law-making, such as the nullification of a statute enacted by a
legislature, is an infrequent occurrence. Most American judges
routinely apply statutory or case law rules to the controversies
before them Without thought of striking out in new legal
directions0
The distinction between the two systems, then, must
not be made in terms of the frequency of judicial attempts to
develop the law, although American judges probably do outdistance
civilian judges in this respect0
The distinction must instead be
made in terms of the attitudes with which the judges in the two
systems approach legal development0
American judges openly
create law, and are partners with the legislature in legal
development. Civilian judges, on the other hand, are cognizant
of their subordination to the legislature, and develop the civil
law indirectly, as a result of legislative grace0
In both systems,
however, substantial legal development is brought about through
judicial action0
james C. Hair

2 4 1d.

at 182, n. 14.

